Ukraine must have nuclear weapons or become a NATO member. After President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke about this in October, there were both strong reactions and speculation about what is more likely—NATO membership or nuclear ambitions. Kyiv officially denies the latter, but the discussion continues, with claims that Ukrainians could create weapons of mass destruction within just a few months. Even if this were to happen—what would it change?
Back in October, during a press conference in Brussels after the European Council meeting, Volodymyr Zelensky shocked some attendees when the conversation turned to decisions Ukraine had to make in the past—specifically in 1994 when the Budapest Memorandum was signed—and decisions it may still need to make. “Who gave up nuclear weapons? Everyone? No, only Ukraine,” Zelensky said, although, in reality, it was not just Ukraine that surrendered nuclear weapons back then. However, he quickly returned to the facts: “Who is fighting today? Therefore, things are as they are now.” In a conversation with Donald Trump, he said: “What could be the solution? Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons and thus a means of defense, or it needs some kind of alliance.” He added, “Currently, there are no effective alliances apart from NATO.” While the Ukrainian president and other officials later reiterated that they had no intentions of turning their country into a nuclear state, contradictory signals persist, with recurring hints that, if desired, Ukrainians could produce nuclear weapons—and it supposedly would not take long. The historical grievances expressed are not mere idle talk; it clearly indicates that this topic is being emphasized with a purpose. But what is that purpose?
Speculation—by both experts and analysts—about how quickly Ukrainians could produce nuclear weapons and where they might use them overshadowed any rational questions: what exactly is desired and what can actually be achieved?
Trump: “Your arguments are justified”
At first glance, there seems to be no big secret here: Ukraine, in a precarious situation and struggling to withstand Russia’s offensive due to a shortage of weaponry, especially personnel, is desperately seeking not only help but also unconventional solutions. The nuclear option, theoretically, is one such solution. Therefore, Zelensky’s meeting with Trump in New York before the elections was supposed to clearly show how prepared Ukraine was if the new U.S. president, as threatened, cut off critical support to Ukrainians.
Zelensky and Trump’s meeting in New York: “I believe Trump heard me back then. He said, ‘Your arguments are justified,'” said Zelensky. But making threats is one thing—something both sides do—and proving the seriousness of intentions is another matter entirely. Coincidentally, soon after, former Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Oleksiy Ryabchuk suggested that if Ukraine were left completely alone—if the U.S. turned away and NATO membership was buried—there would be no other option but to develop its own nuclear weapons.
On October 17, a German publication “Bild” published an article that could have shocked the German public, in which an anonymous current Ukrainian official, allegedly involved in arms procurement, hinted that the country’s policy was simple: Ukraine would not allow a repeat of the February-March 2022 situation, when Russia attempted to capture Kyiv. This means that Ukraine will try to prevent this by any means necessary, even those that seem impossible today, including nuclear weapons. “We have the materials, we have the knowledge. If the order is given, we would need only a few weeks to produce the first device,” boldly claimed the official.
Speculations in “The Sunday Times” further fueled these discussions, suggesting that a study had already been presented to Ukraine’s military and political leadership on how the country could produce a nuclear weapon within a few months. The logic behind this is driven not only by capability but primarily by the 2022 invasion: if Ukraine had had a nuclear weapon back then, would Vladimir Putin have dared to wage an open war? The lack of such a weapon is blamed on the West—according to this narrative, it is indebted to Ukraine because of the Budapest Memorandum, something acknowledged even by former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who pressured Ukraine to surrender its nuclear arsenal in 1994. “I feel terrible and personally responsible because I persuaded the Ukrainians to give up their nuclear weapons, and none of them believe Russia would have invaded Ukraine if they had kept them,” Clinton said to Irish broadcaster RTE.
But that is only one side of the coin—a narrative often repeated in public, as if everything were that simple. In reality, the reasons and consequences of the Budapest Memorandum, as well as Ukraine’s alleged capabilities and the potential to quickly produce nuclear weapons, are surrounded by many myths.
Hidden beneath these myths was the bitter reality. The first myth is obvious: Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons, but it could have kept them. This theory is deeply rooted and persists, ignoring the circumstances and other objective facts of that time. Despite the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had at least 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads and several thousand tactical warheads within its territory, Ukrainians were only theoretical custodians of this arsenal. Yes, in 1991, the country had 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, and more than 40 strategic bombers remained at Ukrainian airbases. However, the use of these nuclear warheads—from launch codes to operational control—was determined by Russia, specifically by its president.
At the time, few in Ukraine could imagine that nuclear weapons might be needed to deter Russia, let alone fight against this “brotherly” nation. Therefore, considerations to somehow take control of the warheads were not on the table. Any attempts to do so would have faced Russian resistance. Additionally, retaining nuclear weapons and not joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would have severely damaged Ukraine’s international reputation at a time when Russia was willingly reducing its nuclear arsenal and Belarus and Kazakhstan completely relinquished theirs.
Even if Ukraine had tried to secretly retain a few warheads, their practical value compared to the theoretical and practical costs would have been negligible. Maintaining a nuclear arsenal requires substantial investments in production, maintenance, and infrastructure—expenses that Ukraine, amidst economic turmoil, could not afford. Dependence on foreign donors, primarily the U.S., was critical. The U.S. stance was unequivocal: Ukraine either signs the START treaty and reduces its nuclear arsenal or relinquishes it altogether in exchange for financial and political support.
Until now, the discussions have centered around talks, suggestions, and threatening behaviors. But the pressing question remains: is nuclear escalation a matter of “if” or “when”? While we hope it remains an “if,” we must be prepared for the possibility if it becomes a reality. Are you prepared to protect your family and loved ones? Do you have a fallout or bomb shelter, and is it equipped with NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) / CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) equipment?
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